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INEQUITABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
PRACTICES AS STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
Universities intend to create knowledge that 
serves the needs of the public, yet this does 
not always happen in practice. By engaging 
in inequitable technology transfer practices, 
such as the exclusive licensing of a novel 
health technology to a private company or a 
spin- off, universities enable the downstream 
formation of pricing monopolies that limit 
affordable access to health technologies.1 2 
The WHO defines health technologies as ‘the 
application of organized knowledge and skills 
in the form of devices, medicines, vaccines, 
procedures and systems developed to solve 
a health problem and improve quality of 
lives’.3 Worldwide nearly 2 billion people 
lack access to essential medicines and 100 
million people are pushed into extreme 
poverty annually due to their inability to pay 
for their healthcare expenditures.4 5 While 
revenues from licensing contribute less than 
4% to universities’ income, since the intro-
duction of the Bayh- Dole Act (1980) the 
pursuit of intellectual property (IP) rights has 
become common practice at higher educa-
tion institutions.2 6 Universities occupy an 
unique position in the innovation ecosystem 
between upstream research and development 
(R&D), which is often publicly funded, and 
downstream commercialisation by the private 
sector. Universities’ decisions on the condi-
tions of technology transfer are an opportu-
nity to resist the status quo of a system that 
is causing a global tragedy of preventable 
deaths by prioritising profits over health.
Structural violence, a concept from peace 
research introduced into the global health 
discourse by physician–anthropologist Paul 
Farmer, describes how institutional structures 
as well as social, historical and economical 
inequities determine whose human rights are 
violated by being denied access to the fruits 
of scientific and medical progress.7 According 
to Farmer these systematic inequalities ‘are 
structural because they are embedded in the 
political and economic organization of our 
Summary box
What is already known?
 ► When universities engage in inequitable technolo-
gy transfer practices, by patenting and exclusively 
licensing biomedical innovations in ways enabling 
pricing monopoly formation, they contribute to 
harmful barriers to access to medicines and other 
health technologies for millions of people.
What are the new findings?
 ► Universities are contributing to the violation of the 
social and economic rights of those unable to ac-
cess novel health technologies by unquestioningly 
engaging in a biomedical innovation system that re-
lies on profit- driven commercialisation of knowledge 
generated with public funding, and this should be 
considered structural violence.
 ► Applying the lens of structural violence can help 
reframe the responsibilities of universities in the 
access to medicines debate by: (1) highlighting uni-
versities’ position in the structures of the biomedical 
innovation system, (2) bringing attention to the sys-
tematic inequities in knowledge dissemination and 
how this can result in differential health outcomes 
when particular groups are denied timely access to 
health innovations and (3) reconsidering the role of 
universities’ technology transfer practices in sus-
taining the unequal structures and power relations 
inherent to the biomedical innovation system.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Universities can apply equitable technology transfer 
practices such as non- exclusive, royalty- free licens-
ing of biomedical innovations to promote access to 
health technologies, ensuring that all members of 
the global public can enjoy the fruits of scientific 
progress.
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social world’ and ‘violent because they cause injury to 
people’.8 Whenever novel health technologies become 
available to only a segment of global society, the health 
gap between the affluent and the poor widens. Mean-
while the number of fatalities that can be completely 
prevented with health technologies already available to 
the fortunate, which Farmer has previously called ‘stupid 
deaths’, increases.7 Approximately 50 000 people die 
prematurely each day from curable medical afflictions.9 
These are victims of structural violence, as inequalities 
in access to healthcare services and affordable medicines 
is intimately linked to inequalities of power, perpetrated 
by our system of IP, as well as social and economic ineq-
uities that determine ‘who suffers and who is shielded’.7 
If these injustices are not constantly questioned and 
resisted, existing inequities in the biomedical innovation 
system are permitted to become further entrenched and 
normalised.7 By taking part in inequitable technology 
transfer practices that perpetuate the existence of an 
inequitable IP system, universities are complicit in viola-
tions of the human rights ‘to a standard of living adequate 
for the health and well- being of himself and of his family, 
including (…) medical care’ (art.25) and ‘“to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits’ (art.27).10
Harm does not need to be intentional for it to qualify 
as structural violence. At the height of the AIDS epidemic 
in 2001, universities held ~25% of patents on antiretro-
viral drugs, including lamivudine (Emory), stavudine 
(Yale) and enfuvirtide (Duke).2 11 Three million AIDS 
deaths were reported that year, many attributable to the 
lack of access to affordable treatment.12 The universities 
owning the patents of these life- saving yet unaffordable 
drugs are enablers of the structural violence that resulted 
in these deaths by contributing to the formation of 
pricing monopolies when they exclusively licensed their 
IP rights to private industry. After extensive campaigning 
by students, faculty members and health activists, Yale 
pressured Bristol Myers Squibb, the pharmaceutical 
company licensed with the exclusive rights to stavudine, 
into not enforcing its academic patent in South Africa.13 
Consequently, the price of the patented drug decreased 
30- fold without any negative consequences to the univer-
sity itself,11 demonstrating that the academic community 
can play a powerful role in ensuring equitable access to 
health technologies.
EQUITABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS A MEANS TO 
CHALLENGE INEQUITIES IN THE BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 
SYSTEM
A critical awareness is needed that the current profit- 
driven commercialisation of science is in stark contrast 
with the mandate of universities as uniquely privileged 
spaces where research is conducted for the benefit 
of public well- being.2 14 The dissemination of univer-
sity research should be rooted in the concept of global 
health equity, which envisions a needs- based approach to 
health and well- being of humanity rather than one based 
on economic and social privileges.1 To uphold these 
commitments to inclusive knowledge dissemination in 
the interest of the public, universities should ensure 
during the technology transfer process that the global 
community receives a return on investing into R&D.1 6 15 
Indeed, pharmaceutical companies often claim that the 
exclusivity of patents and pricing monopolies promote 
risk taking in early innovation, yet universities are often 
the source of important publicly funded research that 
underlies novel health technologies.6 Universities there-
fore have the opportunity to prevent the creation of 
pricing monopolies and access barriers downstream, and 
a responsibility towards the global public who contrib-
uted to R&D funding to do so.
Universities’ technology transfer offices should criti-
cally reconsider the downstream impact of filing patents 
in low- income and middle- income countries (LMICs) 
where they might act as a barrier to access, instead 
allowing for generic production.1 11 For Yale’s stavudine 
during the HIV/AIDS crisis this significantly decreased 
the price.11 Additionally, universities should consider 
retaining the right to issue voluntary non- exclusive 
licenses in the case of health emergencies, such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic14, and implementing step- in rights 
if commercial partners are not adhering to access condi-
tions. By attaching access- oriented clauses to contracts 
during the technology transfer process, universities 
can do their part in promoting a more just biomedical 
innovation system. As the pandemic has brought access 
issues to the forefront of our collective attention, now is 
the right time for universities to adopt more equitable 
policies on technology transfer in line with their commit-
ments to knowledge dissemination for the benefit of the 
public.
THE OXFORD–ASTRAZENECA VACCINE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
Before the pandemic, Oxford was only one of seven UK 
universities committed to the principles of social respon-
sible licensing.1 16 Oxford University Innovation also set 
an important precedent with their statement on ‘Expe-
dited access for COVID-19 related IP’, which announced 
the use of non- exclusive, royalty- free licences as the 
default approach for technology transfer for the dura-
tion of the pandemic.17 Oxford’s commitments to sell the 
vaccine not- for- profit for the duration of the pandemic 
are reflected in the affordable pricing of the Oxford–As-
traZeneca COVID-19 vaccine compared with alternative 
options on the market.18
Yet, LMICs’ access to COVID-19 health technologies, 
including the Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine, is currently 
hampered by a synergy of restrictive patents, lack of 
equitable technology transfer and associated knowhow, 
advanced market commitments by high- income coun-
tries (HICs), temporary export bans, and a dearth of 
funding for scale- up of local manufacturing capacity.19 
Where LMICs have received access, some sources suggest 
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that they are paying more than HICs, for example, South 
Africa is reportedly paying US$5.25 per dose for the 
Serum Institute produced Oxford–AstraZeneca vaccine, 
compared with the European Union which is allegedly 
paying US$3.50 to AstraZeneca directly.18 19 Although 
some of the key clinical trials for the Oxford–AstraZeneca 
vaccine were conducted in South Africa and Brazil,20 
LMICs struggle to secure a vaccine supply,18 19 laying bare 
the structural inequalities in the biomedical innovation 
system.
Despite ensuring that it is one of the most affordable 
vaccines,17 18 at least during the pandemic, by making 
an exclusive deal with a pharmaceutical company like 
AstraZeneca, Oxford transferred the power over knowl-
edge dissemination of a technology largely developed 
using government and charitable funding to the private 
sector.21 The Oxford chimpanzee adenovirus vector 
(ChAdOx) vaccine platform was in an advanced devel-
opment stage at the time of the technology transfer, 
while for the BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna vaccines 
the privatisation of the public knowledge base happened 
early in the R&D process. Given this strengthened negoti-
ation position, Oxford could have considered alternative 
modes of technology transfer that promote affordable 
access such as non- exclusive licensing to multiple phar-
maceutical companies in LMICs, or putting the IP and 
associated knowhow into the WHO’s COVID-19 Tech-
nology Access Pool. The technology transfer process 
around the ChAdOx1 nCoV-19 vaccine should there-
fore have been done more equitably and transparently, 
with Oxford retaining the power to put its commitments 
towards inclusive knowledge dissemination into practice 
to prevent inequalities in vaccine access arising, espe-
cially post- pandemic when affordable pricing conditions 
may no longer apply but the need for an affordable 
COVID-19 vaccine persists.
CONCLUSION
The biomedical innovation system in its current form 
enables the generation of excessive private profits from 
novel health technologies at the expense of people’s lives, 
which should be considered structural violence. Univer-
sities carry responsibility for contributing to preventable 
deaths and suffering when they fail to challenge the status 
quo of a biomedical innovation system that denies access 
to life- saving treatments for millions. Existing inequalities 
are deepened if universities unquestioningly participate 
in a system that relies on the profit- driven commercialisa-
tion of collective knowledge. Universities, critically aware 
of their responsibilities towards inclusive knowledge 
sharing, can instead challenge the ongoing structural 
violence by changing their technology transfer practices 
in ways that promote a more equitable biomedical inno-
vation system.
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